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The Blithedale Romance:
Sympathy, Industry, and the Poet

Matthew Chelf
Shepherd University
Shepherdstown, West Virginia

N

athaniel Hawthorne’s The Blithedale Romance
participates in the antebellum discourse on labor,
the complicated discussion in America over the meaning of
work in the middle of the nineteenth century. As Nicholas
K. Bromell recognizes in his study By the Sweat of the
Brow: Literature and Labor in Antebellum America, during
that critical period, “the nature and the meaning of work
were anxiously discussed and contested as new ideological
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formations were developed to explain and justify new work
practices” (1). These “new ideological formations” that were
designed to understand and manage the changing meaning
of work as the Industrial Revolution progressed not only
impacted labor proper but also held deep ramifications
for the labor of the mind and of creative production.
Antebellum writers such as Hawthorne were prompted “to
revise accepted notions of creativity and to rethink both
the aims and means of their artistic practice” if they were
to survive and flourish in the changing cultural landscape
of industrial America (15). In The Blithedale Romance,
Hawthorne reveals his deep anxiety over both the “new
ideological formations” that attempted to reformulate the
standards by which literary work operated and his own effort
to “revise accepted notions of creativity.” The contested
relationship between aesthetic practice and labor ideology
can be seen in the conflicting relationship between Coverdale
and Hollingsworth and their troubled relationship with the
Blithedale experiment.
Through Coverdale’s Blithedale adventure,
Hawthorne investigates the crisis of the Romantic writer,
with his romantic aesthetic of the sympathetic imagination,
and his imminent collision with modernity, represented
by Hollingsworth’s embrace of industrial morality. As
Frank Christianson recognizes, “The Blithedale Romance
. . . stages an aesthetic contest that takes the sympathetic
imagination as that element of Romanticism which must
be redefined in order to ensure a place for literature in
the modern world” (247). To understand the relationship
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between the “aesthetic contest” in Blithedale and the need
to “ensure” a place for literature in “the modern world,” it is
necessary to recognize Blithedale as a novel on the cusp of
radical social transformation—as capturing the moment the
antebellum era slides into the modern world and conceptions
of American destiny such as an agrarian utopia envisaged
by thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson fade away and assume
the “inexpressibly dreary . . . dingy . . . atmosphere of
city-smoke” that Coverdale eschews upon his departure
for Blithedale from Boston (Hawthorne 45). Coverdale
and Hawthorne share the fear of an encroaching modern
world that subjugates meaningful artistic expression with
cold industry, hence Blithedale’s obsession with exploring
agents of resistance such as a pre-industrial mode of life and
antebellum conceptions of sympathy.
In order to understand the sympathetic imagination,
the capacity to imaginatively and creatively feel what
another feels, as an antebellum construct influencing artistic
practices of the day, it is essential to understand that for
the antebellum era, sympathy was a distinct way of life, a
certain way of looking at the world. Contrary to rationalism,
sympathy elevated the human heart, trusted the emotions,
and possessed an unshakable faith in the inherent goodness
of human nature. Sympathy connected individuals to others
through the heart, an emotional connectedness that creates
a community of individuals who share intangible emotional
bonds. Rather than viewing humanity as comprised of
disparate, isolated individuals, each striving to conquer
the other as Thomas Hobbes asserted, sympathy saw
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emotion as the universal, underlying current that united
all people in a positive, immutable bond, a positivism that
gives rise to egalitarian aspirations such as empathy and
equality as well as Coverdale’s creative modus operandi
the sympathetic imagination. Moments of tears and pity,
exemplified by Coverdale’s forgiving Hollingsworth at the
end of Blithedale—“tears gushed into my eyes, and I forgave
him” (166), symbolize the power of sympathetic connection
and its ability to repair broken relationships and connect
unlike people. Frank Christianson argues that sympathy
was popular among reformers like Coverdale in the midnineteenth century because it provided an alternative sense
of social connection to typical social relations, which were
becoming more and more tinged by industrialism, expanding
markets, and commercialism, precisely the things about
“modern” society the Blithedalers hoped to reform by their
flight to the wilderness (247).
Furthermore, sympathy provided the intellectual
paradigm that allowed antebellum artists and reformers
to transcend prejudice and look towards creating a more
pluralistic society. At least in theory, by casting aside
class privilege, reformers gained an emotional community,
a family bond that transcended race, gender, and socioeconomic status. Sympathy understands human relations as
the holy union between peoples; by imagining a universal,
“ubiquitous experience” that underlies all human action,
sympathy makes possible an expansive sense of family
united through emotional connections (Castiglia 200).
Sympathy, as dramatized in Harriet Beecher Stowe’s novel
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Uncle Tom’s Cabin, allowed for white, middle-class women
from the North to identify with Southern black slaves and
their abjection; feeling the plight of slaves as similar to their
own bondage to their families and homes, white women were
incited to political action and social reform (Levine 225).
Ideally, sympathetic identification imaginatively suspended
the racial prejudices of the members of mainstream society
and allowed them to establish an emotional bond with the
marginalized “other” that held philanthropic and political
underpinnings.
Blithedale represents many of these sentiments,
especially the link between reformist aspirations,
sympathetic emotions, and artistic creation. At one point
in the novel, Zenobia thanks Coverdale for his “beautiful
poetry,” to which he replies: “I hope now…to produce
something that shall really deserve to be called poetry—
true, strong, natural, and sweet, as in the life which we
are about to lead” (12-13). In the furtherance of that goal,
Coverdale soon finds his creative sympathies engaged by
the “pitiableness” of Priscilla’s “depressed and sad…figure,”
the result of her working in a factory. He desires to commit
her “poetical” frailty to verse (21). Set against the surging
tide of the Industrial Revolution, Blithedale, the communal
farm, offers an alternative to the mode of life (and labor
and creativity) that has been created by industrialism and
market capitalism. Blithedale carves out a pre-industrial
enclave in nature where reformers can step back in time and
attempt to reverse, or at least critique and refine, the impact
of industrialism on modern society. Blithedale’s liminal
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occupation of a place and time between pre-industrial and
industrial societies creates a kind of last bastion for the artist
of the sympathetic imagination.
The aesthetic dimension of Coverdale’s sympathetic
imagination is well illustrated in the scene in which Old
Moodie visits Blithedale and inquires about Priscilla’s
whereabouts and well-being, and here readers begin to see
problematic aspects in Romanticism’s ideals. As Coverdale
and Hollingsworth eat lunch after “hoeing potatoes, that
forenoon,” Coverdale spots the degenerated form of an
unexpected visitor, Old Moodie, “skulk[ing] along the edge
of the field” (60). Coverdale instantly takes to describing Old
Moodie’s dilapidated exterior: he is a “shabbily” dressed,
“subdued, undemonstrative old man,” whose “red nose”
indicates his penchant for consuming “a glass of liquor, now
and then, and probably more than was good for him.” His
“shy look about him, as if he were ashamed of his poverty,”
causes Coverdale to recall his previous encounters with the
unfortunate Old Moodie: “‘He haunts restaurants and such
places, and has an odd way of lurking in corners . . . and
holding out his hand, with some little article in it, which
he wishes you to buy.’” Despite his poverty, Old Moodie
remains a harmless person, and even a “tolerably honest
one,” in Coverdale’s eyes. In the end, Old Moodie resembles
a “furtive” rat, a harmless creature “without the mischief, the
fierce eye, the teeth to bite with, or the desire to bite” (60).
Old Moodie’s pathetic figure is noteworthy because
it arouses in Coverdale the powerful sympathetic emotions
that inspire both his call to reform and his imaginative
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leaps into the interior life of the subject. Old Moodie’s
weakness (“a very forlorn old man”) renders him vulnerable
to Coverdale’s “custom” of “making . . . prey of people’s
individualities,” or his sympathetic imagination: “I tried to
identify my mind with the old fellow’s, and take his view
of the world, as if looking through a smoke-blackened glass
as the sun” (61). Coverdale then beholds the following
“through old Moodie’s eyes”:
those pleasantly swelling slopes of our farm,
descending towards the wide meadows, through
which sluggishly circled the brimful tide of the
Charles, bathing the long sedges on its hither and
farther shores; the broad, sunny gleam over the
winding water . . . the sultry heat-vapor, which
rose everywhere like incense, and in which my
soul delighted, as indicating so rich a fervor in the
passionate day, and in the earth that was burning
with its love.” (61)

In his mind, Coverdale derives creative power not through
his volition, imagination, or internal well of emotional
wealth but by looking “through old Moodie’s eyes.” He takes
the plight of Old Moodie, a victim of modernity, and turns
forlornness into a beautiful vista. His encounter with Old
Moodie shows that Coverdale’s sympathetic imagination
creates powerful imagery, elegant prose, and unique insights
into the human condition. This aesthetic program, however,
subjugates the “other” and achieves creative bursts through
the appropriation of Old Moodie’s abjection.
While Coverdale fears the changes wrought by
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industrialism and uses Blithedale and the sympathetic
imagination as a romantic escape into a pastoral way of
life, Hollingsworth embraces modernity for the possibilities
it creates for the reformation and subsequent perfection
of man, as seen in his prison-reform project. With his
constant attention to work and to his philanthropic dream,
the construction of his “visionary edifice” dedicated to the
“reform and mental culture of our criminal brethren” through
“methods moral, intellectual, and industrial” (Hawthorne
41, 91 emphasis added), Hollingsworth is emblematic of
what Paul Faler terms “industrial morality.” In his “Cultural
Aspects of the Industrial Revolution: Lynn, Massachusetts,
Shoemakers and Industrial Morality, 1826-1860,” Faler
provides insight into how Hawthorne participates in the
antebellum discourse on labor and how relevant the concept
of industrial morality is to understanding Blithedale and
Hawthorne’s need to reconsider his aesthetic conceptions.
Taking Lynn, Massachusetts as a microcosm of the Industrial
Revolution in mid-nineteenth century America, Faler
explores the cultural and social changes that occurred in
a New England town as a result of industrialism and the
imposition of industrial morality. Industrial morality, simply
put, was the cultural expression of the Industrial Revolution;
it was, according to Faler, “a new morality based upon the
paramount importance of work,” linking useful productivity
with human worth (220). It enjoined the individual to take
up strict inner discipline, “a tightening up of the moral
code,” that sought to abolish, alter, or sublimate the culture
of leisure or “those customs, traditions and practices that
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interfered with productive labor” (220).
Bruce Laurie goes further to describe the
proselytizing element of industrial morality, whose mission
was to dismantle the culture of leisure, the “culture of sport,
merrymaking, and drinking,” that characterized preindustrial
labor (218). By regarding leisure, and preindustrial culture
by extension, as “wasteful, frivolous and, above all, sinful,”
industrialization based its new morality on regimentation,
uniformity, and efficiency of production, a move that
moralized economics and made the workplace the root of
daily life and modern society (Laurie 219). Civil society
played a crucial role in this process; philanthropists and
reformers formed community groups that became the
“cultural apparatus of ideas and institutions” that instilled
the new values of industry (220). For example, in Lynn,
reformers banded together in The Society for the Promotion
of Industry, Frugality, and Temperance to promote the
following values:
self-discipline, emphasis on productive labor, and
condemnation of wasteful habits. Industry, frugality
and temperance, if conscientiously followed, would
result in savings that would bring material reward
to the wage earner and wellbeing to the community.
(Faler 220)

Industrial morality attempted to replace the community of
feeling, of sympathetic emotions and invisible bonds, with
a community of materialism. Rather than resist the tide of
industrialism as Blithedale attempts to do, civil society—
reformers and philanthropists—in Lynn played an integral
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role in the promulgation of industrialism.
In this way, Hawthorne’s reformer-philanthropist
Hollingsworth resembles the moralists of Lynn more
than Blithedale’s idealists. Industrial morality manifests
itself in Hollingsworth’s inner character as the earnest,
singular attention with which he attempts to consummate
“his philanthropic dream” and in his recurring attempts
to make converts to his cause. Coverdale hints at the
duplicitous undertone and perhaps ulterior motive behind
Hollingsworth’s presence on the first night at Blithedale: “his
heart . . . was never really interested in our socialist scheme,
but was forever busy with his strange and . . . impracticable
plan for the reformation of criminals, through an appeal to
their higher instincts” (27). Coverdale aptly perceives an
aberration of character in Hollingsworth when he reflects
that Hollingsworth had joined Blithedale “actuated by no
real sympathy with our feelings and our hopes,” but because
he had alienated himself “from the world” in his pursuit of
his “lonely and exclusive object” (40). In Coverdale’s eyes,
Hollingsworth’s alienation from the world, due to his pursuit,
has rendered him as “not altogether human”:
There was something else in Hollingsworth, besides
flesh and blood, and sympathies and affections,
and celestial spirit. This is always true of those
men who have surrendered themselves to an overruling purpose. It does not so much impel them
from without, nor even operate as a motive power
within…and finally converts them into little else
save that one principle. (Hawthorne 51)
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Undergirding the passion and zeal by which Hollingsworth
submits to this “over-ruling purpose” and strives towards
nothing else “save for that one principle” is his emphasis
on industrial morality, “the earnest and constant attention to
work” (Faler 220).
That reference to “something else in Hollingsworth”
that is neither “flesh,” sympathy, or spirit alludes to a prior
conversation between Coverdale and Hollingsworth where
the latter proclaims, “I have always been in earnest . . . I
have hammered thought out of iron, after heating the iron
in my heart! Were I a slave, at the bottom of a mine, I
should keep the same purpose, the same faith in its ultimate
accomplishment, that I do now” (49). While asserting that
Coverdale is not in earnest, “either as a poet or a laborer”
(49), Hollingsworth characterizes himself as an earnest
slave, Sisyphean in his interminable labor, trapped within
the iron furnace of his own subsumed, industrial heart.
Furthermore, like a machine, Hollingsworth will always
press on in his mission, destroying those sympathetic
individuals “who should be drawn into too intimate a
connection with him” because he possesses, in Coverdale’s
words, “no heart, no sympathy, no reason, no conscience”
(51). Through “faith” in the earnest attention to “the same
purpose,” Hollingsworth’s labor will come to fruition and his
philanthropic vision will be realized. The passage is nothing
less than Hollingsworth’s articulation of his own personal
industrial morality—the means by which he will achieve his
dream—and a condemnation of Coverdale’s frivolous ways.
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The conflict between the aesthetics of sympathy
and the ideology of labor industry culminates during
Hollingsworth’s final attempt to convert Coverdale to
his cause. In response to Coverdale’s revelry over the
“romantic story” their labor at Blithedale will make for their
progeny, Hollingsworth says, “Listen to me, Coverdale.
Your fantastic anticipations make me discern . . . what
a wretched, unsubstantial scheme is this. . . I ask you to
be, at last, a man of sobriety and earnestness, and aid me
in an enterprise which is worth all our strength, and the
strength of a thousand mightier than we!” (91). The higher
“purpose in life, worthy of the most extreme self-devotion,”
that Hollingsworth offers to Coverdale reflects industrial
morality’s proselytizing mission to replace the cultures,
ethics, and ideologies it deems inferior and wasteful, such
as Coverdale’s life of “aimless beauty,” his embrace of
sympathy (93). Hollingsworth’s deep desire, bordering on
religious destiny, to promulgate his morality is well alluded
to in his comparison with the “venerable apostle Eliot,” a
comparison that links his “Indian auditory” with Coverdale,
Priscilla, Zenobia, and the criminals he hopes to correct and
edify through “methods moral, intellectual, and industrial”
(83, 91). While Coverdale is able to resist Hollingsworth’s
Faustian bargain with an emphatic negative, his denial
underscores Hollingsworth’s criticism that Coverdale is
neither a poet nor laborer and that his call to poetry and to
reform—sympathy—lacks inner conviction.
Hawthorne stages the contest between sympathy
and industry to consider the validity of his own calling: how
useful is the poet in industrial society? Would industrialists,
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like Hollingsworth, who “never had the slightest
appreciation of [Coverdale’s] poetry,” (49) regard poetry, if
not art in general, as “frivolous” or even “sinful”? What are
we to make of Coverdale’s abandonment of poetry at the end
of the novel if not that it was a dying art, displaced by the
machine? The antebellum discourse on labor and its cultural
productions, such as industrial morality, posed a mortal
threat to Hawthorne’s creative calling. As such, Blithedale
grapples with the forces of change and their conflict with
convention. Hawthorne’s desire to abstract himself out of his
present situation through romantic invention belies his active
engagement with the modern world. Hawthorne questions
sympathy’s ability truly to understand the “other” while
simultaneously trying to inhabit the lives of his characters.
With its new standards of ascertaining value, The Blithedale
Romance speaks to Hawthorne’s fear of industry’s iron
hammer as the death knell for poetry. In the final analysis,
rather than identify, as the novel’s treatment of sympathy
would have us do, with Coverdale’s retired life of quiet
complacency or Hollingsworth’s shattered heart, Hawthorne
asks us to look beyond contemporary obstructions and to
affirm art and poetry’s place in modern society.
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Dryden and Baroque Chamber Music

Dan Sperrin
Lincoln College, Oxford
United Kingdom

I

t is no wonder that Henry Purcell and John Dryden
came together for King Arthur. The baffling clutch
of 60 notation manuscripts and the missing libretto mean
that the origins and intricacies of the collaboration remain
elusive (Winn 33), but it is clear from what we do possess
that Purcell’s music and Dryden’s words synthesised with
marked artistic cohesion. Indeed, the language of Dryden’s
odes and satires is consistently inflected with a composer’s
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sensitivity to orchestration, whereby sound and syntax weave
together like instrumental timbres. Although some lucid
comparisons between Dryden and composers contemporary
to his time can be found in the wealth of criticism on his
work, this essay deliberately merges technical musicianship
and verse, providing a rare perspective on Dryden’s poetry.
Where better to begin any exploration of this topic
than “An Ode, On The Death of Henry Purcell,” in which
Dryden turns composer in imitation of his subject. The
music of Dryden’s verse is the kind that emerges from finely
tuned close reading that we come to by using our ears as
much as our eyes. The first stanza is baroque chamber music
incarnate, the details of which shall be laid out quickly for
the sake of brevity, but with an attempt at accuracy and
wholeness:
		
I
Mark how the Lark and Linnet Sing,
With rival Notes
They strain their warbling Throats,
To welcome in the Spring.
But in the close of Night,
When Philomel begins her Heav’nly lay,
They cease their mutual spite,
Drink in her Music with delight,
And list’ning and silent, and silent and list’ning,
And list’ning and silent obey.
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We are tuned into the work with an imperative: “Mark.”
This arresting tonic is then tied to “Lark,” which begins
an ornithological strain carrying through alliteratively into
“Linnet.” The verb “Sing” calls backwards—by virtue of
also being a verb—to “Mark,” and before we know it, we
have something that resembles a periodic, melodic subject,
“in the key of birds,” perhaps. As is typical of baroque
chamber music, evidenced in Corelli’s violin sonatas and
Telemann’s Paris quartets, or perhaps more relevantly in
Purcell’s viol fantasias, the subject is then meticulously
unraveled outwards across the rest of the stanza, while
being inflected with various twists of intonation; however, it
strictly maintains itself as a conceptual development of the
opening material (this was later taken to its farthest extreme
in eighteenth-century piano sonatas, typified by Mozart). As
these birds turn the verb “sing” into “strain” (phonologically
close yet conceptually in friction), they locate themselves in
“Spring” and lose their “Spite.” The ‘s’ sounds concatenate
throughout the stanza and bring about a sonic unity between
the birds, the season, and their mood. To accompany this, as
a kind of counter-melody, ‘w’ sounds on “with,” “welcome,”
and “when” synchronize alongside the main narrative
‘s’-sound arc and set up a kind of linguistic counterpoint,
whereby ‘w’ and ‘s’ flit between one another to mimic the
trilling melodies of the singing birds. As though the complex
texture of musical imitation was not technical enough by
now, the final two lines become transcendent of necessarily
monophonic verse and branch into harmony: the retrograde
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repetitions of “list’ning and silent” set up a pattern identical
to a cycle of fifths—a little twist on the common chiasmus.
This harmonic technique works by making dominant chords
repeatedly jump to one another underneath the main melody,
which not only creates a plangent, stable base from which
the ornamentation can spring but also gives baroque music
its color, its overall tonality. Silence and listening, of course,
are integral to an ode in precisely the same way that the cycle
of fifths is the harmonic bedrock of baroque counterpoint.
The final swish, which links all of these intricacies together,
is the plan of the stanza, whereby the ornamental trills and
subjects occur at the top (opening lines), the developments
and counter-melodies in the center, and the verbal cycle-offifths at the bottom, which directly replicates both the setup
of sheet music and the roles each instrument would play
on the page. It is a masterpiece of musical imitation, if one
unpicks the initially deadening tones of lament.
It seems, then, that it is possible to read Dryden
in this way. A deliberately experimental close reading, as
above, where the intricacies of musical composition are
sought in a Pindaric ode, seems to work. But the imitative
delicacies of finely tuned language, as exhibited in the
Purcell stanza, are everywhere in Dryden’s oeuvre, and
potently draw out the life of his subject matter. As put by
Earl Miner in Dryden’s Poetry, the musical quality of the
verse is “rather an intellectual articulation of feeling than
an emotional development of ideas” (231). This seems
right, landing squarely on the way in which Dryden’s verse
can feel both stale and enlivened at once, especially to
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postmodern audiences unaccustomed to the formal rigor of
Augustan verse. To this section of “An Evening’s Love,”
in which the fuzziness of experience is figured through
exquisite ambiguities of sound:
When, with a sigh, she accords me the blessing,
And her eyes twinkle ‘twixt pleasure and pain,
Ah, what a joy ‘t is, beyond all expressing,
Ah what a joy to hear: “Shall we again?”
						

(13-16)

Of course, the ecstatic sensuousness of the repeated “ah”
sound is prominent. Not only does this abstract syllable
begin two adjacent lines, but it emerges from the end of
innocuous words like “hear” and “pleasure” upon re-reading:
the half-aspirated, half-growled openness of this syllable
is both mimetic of mid-coital enthusiasm and post-coital
release. Dryden is having some fun here. Once the “ah”
is heard, it cannot be unheard in open-ended words like
“hear” and “pleasure,” which take on a palpable sexual
quality where it once existed in mere semantics. But this is
not all: there is something strangely both sharp and blunt in
the prefix “tw,” which quickly prods akimbo with “twinkle
‘twixt.” It stabs, but with a cork. It jabs but it doesn’t hurt.
We are, as in the verse itself, “’twixt pleasure and pain.”
This kind of awkward paradox also exists in the repetition
of “what a joy,” which questions itself by assertion one time
too many. The repetition brings about a strange musical
hook of monotony, of things being oddly familiar, of being
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overly assertive and unable truly to give way to ecstatic
lyricism. Dryden’s soundscape of sexual experience then
neatly captures a kind of delusional optimism, where the
constantly affirmative presentation of “joy” and “pleasure”
is tarred with “pain” and plangent repetition. This is what
Miner means by an “intellectual articulation of feeling”: this
clamping of experience into highly wrought verse on the
one hand deadens the vitality of lived experience, but on the
other allows a patterned ekphrasis to occur from within this
strict framework.
The heroic couplet, however, is occasionally
broken to allow a more “emotional development of ideas.”
Christopher Ricks draws our attention to Dryden’s triplets
as being form-defying and of exceptional merit. The thesis
of his article is that Dryden’s triplets are not only “little
intended to,” but carry a wealth of meaning in their breaking
of the heroic couplet—primarily by the virtue of being
bond-breaking. His systematic working through of the seven
triplets in “Absalom and Architophel” (with occasional
glance at “The Hind and The Panther”) leads him to the
following conclusion: the triplet “resists or tempers the
despotism of the couplet” and it has a “particular finality
of emphasis.” Of course, Ricks’ way of reading Dryden’s
triplets is pertinent and illuminating, but the musical essence
of the triplet could be pushed a lot further. In chamber
music, for example, one searches in vain through Purcell’s
viol fantasias without a single authentic triplet. Similarly,
in Corelli’s violin sonatas, they simply do not exist. The
baroque composer seems to have considered compound time
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to be the way into triplets, and their only rightful place. With
no surprise, then, the search becomes abundantly successful
when we turn to something like Corelli’s Trio Sonata in D
Major, Op.3 no.2 (the Allegro), which by virtue of being
in compound time (6/8) is a sea of triplets. But is there any
crossover, as with the injection of triplets into “Absalom and
Architophel”? Cue Purcell’s famous Abdelazer Overture,
where triplets are whispering their influence in the main
melody of the second subject. After the stately climb of
the first subject, the second exhibits a falling sequence that
bounces between crotchets and pairs of quavers:

Look at that first violin. Purcell employs triplet groups
about as often as Dryden—that is, hardly ever—but when
they do occur, they irreversibly change the essence of the
music. In this section of the Abdelazer Rondeau, the string
voices are consistently “iambic”: that is, straight-laced,
only crotchets and quavers and the occasional minim. The
regular denominations and groupings of notes bring about
this stilted and corseted temperament, which create, like
Dryden’s highly wrought heroic couplets, a system of intense
formality from which the energy can emerge. When we enter
the more whimsical second subject (pictured), however, the
groups of crotchets and quavers find themselves triplet-ing
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up and creating that gigue-like skip we know about from
compound time. It is like a processing regiment of soldiers
that suddenly decide to hop, skip, and jump: the illusion
of triplets begins to lift the mood into something quirkily
bright.
This precise technique, of superimposing compoundtime triplets onto ostensibly common time, sounds-off the
opening to Dryden’s “To the Memory of Mr. Oldham”:
Farewell, too little and too lately known,
Whom I began to think and call my own,
For sure our souls were near allied, and thine
Cast in the same poetic mould with mine.

In the first two lines, we have a tripartite configuration of
“too,” where the third part is “to.” Just like a crotchet and
two quavers, perhaps? Moreover, the alliteration on ‘s’
occurs three times with “sure,” “souls,” and “same,” which
is also a crotchet and two quavers of ‘sh’ and ‘s’, ‘s.’ Further
spread out, “farewell” (with the stress on ‘w’), “whom,”
and “were” is another crotchet and two quavers of ‘h’
and ‘w’, ‘w.’ The essential beauty of these three (!) triplet
configurations? They are almost entirely unstressed, with the
exception of the “well” in ‘farewell,” which we suppose has
to be stressed because it is the opening exclamation. Here
Dryden presents a delicate and complex imitation of that
identified Purcellian technique of slotting triplet groups into
common time; in doing so on (almost) entirely unstressed
syllables, he allows it to guide the meanderings of the
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verse without taking over as the overbearing feature. The
exceptionally rich detail of these first four lines, musically
speaking, is in friction with the almost coyly simple conceit,
in which Oldham is not quite a Dryden, but a lamentably
worthy heir to the Dryden throne. The technical complexity
continues: to assess the number three in this poem could be
an endless spiral of observation. The three primary tenses
are used to set up the lineage of great poetry; there is a real
“Ricks-ian” triplet late on that imitates the idea of “generous
fruits” and “maturing time” by transcending formality and
expectation; and alliterating sounds seem always to be in a
crotchet/two-quaver trinity, in some way or other (“poetic,”
“cast,” “common”; “slippery,” “race,” “ripe”). But though
this can go on (seemingly) forever, it is the sonic quality
of the triplet that truly cements our impression of Dryden’s
verse, which unifies the weft of the meter in a way that is
manifestly life-giving. In which case, even though Ricks
picked up on an endlessly fertile subject in Dryden’s triplets,
he did not make quite the fullest of its musical implications
that he could. When we look at a music composer’s use
of triplets, as with Purcell’s famous Abdelazer Rondeau,
we can see that the baroque conception of the tripartite
microstructure was felt more deeply than just “three lines
together,” more deeply than just “compound time.” It seems
that the musicality of triples extends into being a unifying
feature of melody and rhythm where the restrictions of the
form should not strictly allow so. Dryden loved this.
Thus, a musical reading of Dryden reveals several
nuances of his verse that evidence an eccentric but sensitive
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poetic wit. Whether he is imitating the graphics of sheet
music in the first stanza of the Purcell ode, complicating pure
ekphrasis in “An Evening’s Love” and mimicking difficult
emotional ambiguity, or having a distinctly Purcellian swing
at fusing musical modes and phrasing, he is always in tune
with how form and language can be instrumental as musical
aids to his grander scheme of meaning. As a final blazon of
musicality, consider the last line of the ode on Purcell, which
is entirely built with monosyllabic, resonant, dark vowel
sounds like a last chord on the organ, Purcell’s instrument
and the site of his final resting place:
The gods are pleased alone with Purcell’s lays,
Nor know to mend their choice.
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Hysteria and the Performance of Masculinity:
A Feminist Reading of James Joyce’s “A Painful Case”

Adam Quinn
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O

ne of the most significant contributions of structuralist
linguistic theory to contemporary feminist literary
theory has been the formulation of binary oppositions. First
articulated by Ferdinand de Saussure in his posthumously
published 1916 work Course in General Linguistics, binary
oppositions are a part of the inherent structure of language
which defines words by their opposites. In a binary system,
dark is defined as not-light, black is defined as not-white,
and bad is defined as not-good. These terms occupy a place
of either privilege or disfavor based on their position within
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the binary. In the previous example, light is privileged over
dark, white is privileged over black, and good is privileged
over bad. Later structuralist theorists such as Claude LéviStrauss applied Saussure’s definition of linguistic binaries to
societies and systems of thought. Because all human thought
is mediated by language, this same binary logic is one of
the structures by which people understand the world. The
fundamental binary of feminist theory is the binary between
masculine and feminine. Implicit in each gender binary
are secondary binaries: masculinity as rational, femininity
as irrational; masculinity as non-emotional, femininity as
over-emotional. In each of these gender binaries, the male,
rational, and non-emotional are clearly privileged.
The disfavored status of the feminine as irrational
and over-emotional in this gender binary leads to the
conception of the feminine as hysterical. The root of the
word “hysteria” comes from the Greek word “hystera,”
meaning “uterus.” The Greeks believed that hysteria was
an emotional condition peculiar to women, caused by
menstrual cycles. In English usage, “hysteria” is a state of
excess or uncontrollable emotion that has become part of the
Western paradigmatic description of femininity. As it relates
to femininity, hysteria not only casts the feminine as overemotional but also renders women incapable of controlling
emotion and therefore irrational.
James Joyce’s story “A Painful Case” from his 1914
short story collection Dubliners describes a friendship and
potential romantic relationship between two characters—Mr.
James Duffy and Mrs. Emily Sinico—that is abruptly ruined
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by hysteria. Mr. Duffy, an ostensibly masculine bank teller,
fears hysteria as a feminine emotional force that threatens
to undermine his masculinity. As a result, when Mrs. Sinico
attempts physical and emotional intimacy with Mr. Duffy
by pressing his hand to her cheek, he interprets her behavior
as hysterical and impulsively breaks off their relationship.
However, upon reading the news of Mrs. Sinico’s tragic
death four years later, Mr. Duffy reacts with extreme and
uncontrollable emotional upheaval and irrationality. Through
his compulsive fear of hysteria, Mr. Duffy ironically
reveals himself to be emotionally hysterical, undermining
his performance of masculinity and deconstructing the
gendering of hysteria itself.
Mr. Duffy’s performance of masculinity depends on
his ability not to exhibit hysteria. Instead, Mr. Duffy counters
any emotional impulse that threatens to become hysteric
by retreating to hyper-rationality. As a result, Mr. Duffy’s
gendered identity is built around a negation: not-hysteria.
Based upon Judith Butler’s claim that gender is not an
essential identity but “an identity instituted through a stylized
repetition of acts” (900, emphasis Butler’s), Mr. Duffy
performs his gender through his rejecting hysteria. Mr. Duffy
is able to perform not-hysteria by reversing each of its terms:
if hysteria is overly emotional and irrational, not-hysteria
must be non-emotional and hyper-rational. This performance
of not-hysteria composes Mr. Duffy’s masculinity. Mr.
Duffy’s gender identity becomes what Butler describes as
“a performative accomplishment which the mundane social
audience, including the actors themselves, come to believe
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and to perform in the mode of belief” (901). Because Mr.
Duffy believes in his own performance, he is not conscious
of his own fear of hysteria.
Mr. Duffy reacts to his fear of hysteria with a
compulsive need to emphasize his own rationality and
masculinity. Joyce’s initial description of Mr. Duffy offers
an insight into the character’s unsuccessful masculine
performance and amorphously gendered nature. Mr. Duffy’s
house is described as “somber,” his floors are “uncarpeted”
and his walls are “free from pictures” (317). “Black” and
“iron”—dual signifiers for masculinity—appear again and
again in Mr. Duffy’s furnishings: “black iron bedstead,”
“iron washstand,” “a fender and irons,” and “a black and
scarlet rug” (317). Each black item in the room, however, is
matched by an opposing white item, reflecting Mr. Duffy’s
conflicting impulses. Mr. Duffy’s bookcase is made of
“white wood,” his bed is covered in “white bedclothes,”
and a “white-shaded lamp” is the “sole ornament of [his]
mantelpiece” (317). Looking around the room at the
furniture that “[h]e had himself bought” (317), Mr. Duffy’s
outlook on life is literally black and white. He views
life through the stark binary oppositions of rationality/
irrationality and stoicism/hysteria. Anything that he classifies
as “black“ becomes privileged as masculine—traditional
bedstead, utilitarian washstand, practical fender and irons,
and pointedly functional rug—while anything that he
classifies as “white” becomes associated with femininity
and dreaded hysteria—decorative bookcase shelves, soft
bedclothes, and a condemningly ornamental lamp. However,
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the presence of both black and white objects in the physical
space of his room exposes Mr. Duffy’s flawed gender
performance and reveals him to be equally rational and
irrational, stoic and hysterical, and, by the extension of his
gendered logic, both masculine and feminine. Mr. Duffy
strives so hard to remove himself from emotion and the
threat of hysteria that he even separates his rationality from
his physicality, “liv[ing] at a little distance from his body”
while simultaneously “regarding his own acts with doubtful
side-glances” (318). His habit of composing sentences about
himself in the third person and in the past tense reflects his
separation of mind from body as well as the classical binary
that privileges writing over speech (318). Because Mr.
Duffy’s performance of masculinity depends on his ability
to perform rationality, the threat of hysteria—that deadly
combination of emotion and irrationality—is the threat to
undermine his performance of masculinity. As a result, Mr.
Duffy is particularly vulnerable to intrusive emotion because
to risk performing hysteria is to completely dismantle his
gendered identity.
Mr. Duffy exploits his relationship with Mrs.
Sinico as an opportunity to prove his own performance of
masculinity to himself. In this role, Mr. Duffy only views
Mrs. Sinico as an audience or background for his own
egocentric performances. Judith Butler uses the metaphor
of theatre to explain the way gender is performed in her
essay “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution.” She
compares gender to a role that an actor plays rather than
any essential quality of the actor (906). Expanding on this
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metaphor, Mr. Duffy’s performance of masculinity cannot be
real unless he has an audience. In his relationship to Emily
Sinico, Mr. Duffy finds that audience. However, Mr. Duffy’s
relationship to Mrs. Sinico is inherently dangerous: as a
feminine audience she has the ability to affirm Mr. Duffy’s
performance of masculinity but as a potentially hysterical
woman she also has the ability to radically undermine that
performance.
Mr. Duffy’s first meeting with Mrs. Sinico outlines
his relationship with her as performative for the rest of the
story. He consistently relates to her in an intellectualized,
dispassionate way while she repeatedly attempts to relate to
him in more intimate, personal ways. Consistent with Mr.
Duffy’s emotional and relational detachment, Mrs. Sinico is
the one who initiates their relationship. In the only instance
of direct address in the story, Mrs. Sinico—at a concert that
both she and Mr. Duffy happen to be attending—observes:
“What a pity there is such a poor house tonight! It’s so
hard on people to have to sing to empty benches” (319).
Unfortunately, Emily Sinico has unknowingly predicted
her own role within the story. Mr. Duffy, as a man defined
by his furniture, is immediately associated with empty
benches. This self-described “outcast from life’s feast” (325)
is emotionally and relationally empty just like the benches
and the furniture that he buys. Mrs. Sinico, in contrast, is
immediately associated with the singer. Her love of music
causes her to come into contact with Mr. Duffy and she
continues to be connected to music—at least in Mr. Duffy’s
mind—for the rest of the story. After Mr. Duffy ends his
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relationship with Mrs. Sinico, he “[keeps] away from
concerts lest he should meet her” (321), firmly linking her
with musicality and the performance of music. Mr. Duffy’s
initial “liking for Mozart’s music” which “brought him
sometimes to an opera or a concert” (318) at the beginning
of the story indicates emotional sympathies which Emily
Sinico later comes to represent. Indeed, Mr. Duffy’s habit of
attending concerts is described as “the only dissipations of
his life” (318) and the only detail of his description which
hints toward Mr. Duffy’s emotional vulnerabilities.
In contrast, Mr. Duffy first relates to Mrs. Sinico by
analytically assessing her like a new furniture purchase. He
appraises her based on the dual criterion of feminine beauty
and sex appeal and masculine rationality—demanding that
she perform both masculine and feminine gender roles at the
same time. He finds Mrs. Sinico to possess a “temperament
of great sensibility” and a face that exhibits “intelligence”
(319). Mr. Duffy’s later pseudo-philosophical reflection that
“[l]ove between man and man is impossible because there
must not be sexual intercourse and friendship between man
and woman is impossible because there must be sexual
intercourse” (321) manifests his expectation that a true
companion should be able to perform multiple genders
at once. However, contradicting this expectation, he also
evaluates her in explicitly sexual terms, confining her to
the performance of femininity. He immediately deduces
her age as “a year or so younger than himself”—making
her a possible sexual partner— while imperiously deciding
that her face “must have been handsome,” and casually
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noting that her “bosom [is] of a certain fullness” (319).
Mr. Duffy expects Mrs. Sinico to perform multiple genders
simultaneously in order to balance his need for emotional
validation with his fear of emotional hysteria and retreat into
hyper-rationality.
Throughout the story, Mrs. Sinico successfully
performs gender multiplicity and healthy relational
capacities while Mr. Duffy performs gender stagnation and
an anesthetized approach to relationships. Mrs. Sinico is
successfully able to navigate both rationality and emotional
competency while Mr. Duffy rejects all forms of emotional
expression to protect his tenuously enacted performance of
hyper-rational masculinity. Mr. Duffy is able to relate to Mrs.
Sinico only through rationality: he “share[s] his intellectual
life with her” through “books” and “ideas” (319). Emily
Sinico, in contrast, attempts to cultivate a more personal
relationship with Mr. Duffy. “In return for his theories”
she gives him “some fact of her life” which he is unable
to appreciate or reciprocate (319-320). All of the verbs
used to describe Mr. Duffy’s relationship to Mrs. Sinico
are active: he “entangle[s] his thoughts with hers,” lends
books, provides ideas, and shares “intellectual life” (319).
Mrs. Sinico is only able to relate to Mr. Duffy with a single
passive verb construction: “She listened to all” (319). In
her passive state, Mrs. Sinico becomes an audience for Mr.
Duffy’s gender performance.
Mr. Duffy’s relationship with Mrs. Sinico ends
abruptly, however, as soon as Mrs. Sinico reaches through
the stage curtain to intrude upon Mr. Duffy’s performance
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of masculinity. Mrs. Sinico’s moment of action in which she
grasps Mr. Duffy’s hand “passionately” (320) and presses
it to her cheek is a transgressive breach of the separation
between performer and audience that Mr. Duffy has so
carefully maintained. This act of passion is everything
that threatens Mr. Duffy’s masculinity—it is spontaneous,
uncontrolled, emotional, and irrational. Mr. Duffy’s
immediate reaction is panicked and instinctive. He cuts off
contact with Mrs. Sinico sharply, refusing to visit her for a
week and becoming disillusioned with their relationship. In
contrast to his earlier insistence that he visit her at her home
instead of meeting her outside in parks—citing a “distaste
for underhand ways” (310), Mr. Duffy’s final arrangements
involve an outdoor rendezvous “in a little cake shop near
the Parkgate” (320). Here they formally break off their
relationship and Mr. Duffy rejects all human contact as
“a bond to sorrow” (321). Upon their final parting, Mrs.
Sinico has an emotional reaction that Mr. Duffy interprets
as hysteria. Walking toward the tram to leave, Mrs. Sinico
begins “to tremble so violently that, fearing another collapse
on her part, [Mr. Duffy] bade her good-by quickly and left
her” (321). Symptomatic of their relationship, Mr. Duffy’s
first instinct is not concerned with Mrs. Sinico’s health but
with his own tenuous gender construction. In order to protect
his emotional detachment from the threat of hysteria (which
he apparently believes is more contagious than a common
cold) Mr. Duffy flees all contact with Emily Sinico to retreat
once again into his realm of rationality.
By examining this reaction to hysteria and others,
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it becomes clear that Mr. Duffy associates hysteria with
sexuality. As a result, Mr. Duffy fears any and all sexual
contact that may lead to hysteria. Mr. Duffy’s anxieties
about sexual relationships and hysteria are reflected in Luce
Irigaray’s categorization of women as Mother, Virgin, and
Prostitute in her essay “Women on the Market.” Although
Irigaray specifically defines these categories as relating to the
value of women in the marketplace, they are usual divisions
for understanding the way Mr. Duffy conceptualizes the roles
of women. As a married woman and mother, Mrs. Sinico
naturally falls into Irigaray’s category of Mother (809).
For Irigaray, Mothers are excluded from exchange because
they have already been claimed by their husbands (809).
Irigaray’s Mother is both non-sexual and non-hysterical:
“Their responsibility is to maintain the social order without
intervening so as to change it” (807). As long as Mrs. Sinico
remains in this limited role as Mother, her relationship to
Mr. Duffy is non-threatening. However, as soon as Mrs.
Sinico attempts to exercise sexuality outside of the bounds
of marriage by catching Mr. Duffy’s hand to her cheek, Mr.
Duffy automatically classifies her as a Prostitute and flees
the threat of hysteria that a Prostitute represents. Irigaray’s
Prostitute is characterized by “seductiveness” that exists
“to arouse the consumer’s desire” (808). She is explicitly
emotional and sexual: her role has been defined in such a
way that she creates both emotional upheaval and sexual
desire in men. Although sexuality is often associated with
masculine gender roles, Mr. Duffy interprets sexuality as
an inherent threat to his masculinity. Because Mr. Duffy’s
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masculinity depends on rationality, the inherently emotional
nature of sex makes it directly opposed to his masculinity.
Judith Butler describes gender performance as
“a project which has cultural survival at its end” (903).
Especially in the world of “A Painful Case,” gender is
a performance with what Butler calls “clearly punitive
consequences” (903). Read through Butler’s framework of
gender performance as cultural survival, Mrs. Sinico’s death
can be interpreted as a direct result of hysteria. Although
she is technically killed when she is hit by a train while
crossing the tracks as a railroad station, the newspaper article
which reports her death lists the actual cause of death as
“shock and a sudden failure of the heart’s action” (323).
Based on centuries of faulty medical understanding that
defined hysteria as a uniquely female medical complaint
with symptoms including emotional shock and weakness
of the heart, it is hard to read this description of death as
anything other than hysterical. While specifically referring
to a railroad track, the fact that Mrs. Sinico is killed while
“attempting to cross the line” can be easily read as an
attempt to cross gender lines (322). Mary Lowe-Evans
observes that the details of Mrs. Sinico’s death “conjure
an image of a diminished, Emma-like woman desperate to
break through the boundaries (cross the lines) of a space
(her own circumscribed life, perhaps)” (397). In this attempt
Mrs. Sinico is struck down as punishment for attempting
to perform gender qualities outside of her narrow role as
Mother. It is this same act of “crossing the line” in her
relationship with Mr. Duffy that causes him to label and
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reject her as hysterical. Mrs. Sinico’s death by train is an
indictment of her earlier injury caused by Mr. Duffy’s rebuff.
Mr. Duffy and the Kingstown train play the same role in
ending Emily Sinico’s life.
After reading the newspaper account detailing “The
Painful Case” of Mrs. Sinico, Mr. Duffy has a hysterical
reaction to the news of her death. Mirroring the emotional
activity that Mr. Duffy interpreted as hysterical in Mrs.
Sinico, Mr. Duffy spends the remainder of the story in a
state of extreme emotional instability and irrationality. Mr.
Duffy abandons his formerly restrained choice of words to
unleash a flurry of exclamations and exaggerations: “What
an end!” (323); “His soul’s companion!” (324); “Just God,
what an end!” (324); “But that she could have sunk so
low!” (324). His emotional state renders him completely
unable to finish his dinner and he rushes home in order to
compose himself (323). He then reacts vindictively against
Emily Sinico, distorting and questioning his own supposedly
rational memory of her to wonder if it could be possible
that “he had deceived himself so utterly about her” (324).
From this point, Mr. Duffy turns to alcohol to deal with his
emotional disturbance. Unwittingly mirroring Mrs. Sinico’s
reaction to the end of her relationship with Mr. Duffy four
years earlier, Mr. Duffy goes to the nearest public-house
and drinks whiskey punch alone. In the same park where
he and Mrs. Sinico last saw each other, he imagines her
presence in the darkness, feeling “her voice touch his ear”
and “her hand touch his” (325). By the time Mr. Duffy is
jealously bemoaning his fate in the silence of night, he has
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succumbed to full emotional hysteria and has dismissed both
his rationality and his performance of masculinity.
Mr. Duffy’s state of hysteria reveals his former
performance of masculinity to be nothing other than a sham.
This reading of the ending of “A Painful Case” reveals Mr.
Duffy to be an essentially hysterical character who gives an
unconvincing performance of hyper-rational masculinity. At
the abrupt and emotional ending of his relationship with Mrs.
Sinico, Mr. Duffy exhibits a hysterical reaction to the fear of
hysteria. When confronted with any emotion that threatens to
undermine his performance of masculinity, Mr. Duffy always
chooses to flee. However, it is not emotional instability or
his relationship with Mrs. Sinico that triggers hysteria in
Mr. Duffy; it is his irrational fear of hysteria. Mr. Duffy’s
insecurity about his performance of masculinity ironically
prompts him to perform the hysteria he associates with
femininity. Using deconstructive logic, the case of Mr. Duffy
shows hysteria to be both unrelated to either masculinity or
femininity and a false description of emotional stimulation
itself.
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The Sublime Experience:
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in William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom!
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W

illiam Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! serves as
the culmination of all of the themes and narrative
methods used within the writer’s previous works. The novel
is also one of the primary examples of his transition from
just a Southern author to a great American author. Indeed,
while confronting moral issues concerning the history of
the South and expanding them through cultural references
and various characters’ subjective perspectives, Faulkner’s
novel becomes universally applicable and forces readers
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to question their own moral capacities. By presenting a
multiplicity of individual perspectives as part of the saga
of the American South, Faulkner’s novel emphasizes the
tension between individual and collective morality and
suggests that, by achieving the philosophical, sublime
experience whose roots are in the Enlightenment, both the
characters and the readers can reach a sense of universal,
collective truth that is vital to their capacity for moral
judgment.
By reinforcing a binary between the individual and
the collective, Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom! expresses the
philosophical idea of the sublime as introduced by Immanuel
Kant. In “Narrating the Sublime in Absalom, Absalom!
and The Unvanquished,” Adam Jabbur explains that while
there is no evidence that Faulkner ever read Kant’s theory
of the sublime, these ideas were most likely passed down
to him through modernist thought (9). Kant’s theory of the
sublime (inspired by the revived eighteenth-century interest
in the topic due to the discovery of Longinus’ ancient text
on the sublime) asserts that within the two subliminal states,
mathematical and dynamical, there is an awareness of the
loftiness or grandness of an object within nature or artistic
representation, which in turn leads us to feel a kind of
inadequacy or fear from being overwhelmed by this object.
However, we compensate for this inadequacy through our
human faculties of reason and imagination, thus leading
us to feel a sense of power and superiority as we reflect
on our nature as moral beings. Jabbur explains that “the
mind itself becomes sublime as the free play of reason and
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imagination arouses our ‘supersensible’ faculty, allowing
us to imagine something that does not exist in reality, and
thus to show our superiority to it: the courage, morality, and
freedom of the individual” (9). Applied to the debate over
mimetic art, this concept of the sublime weaved its way
into much of Romantic literature (for example, Coleridge’s
reconciliation of opposites and Shelley’s claim about
poetry’s moral function); and the concept of the sublime also
had social implications because of its influence on political
thought, specifically the social contract theorists, whose
concepts framed the U.S. Constitution. As they reach mental
sublimity, individuals enter the realm of the collective,
reflecting on the moral capacity of all humankind. Thus, the
social contract’s contending issues of individual freedom
versus collective responsibility reflect Kant’s notion of the
sublime.
The sublime and its related ideas in social contract
theory are relevant to the novel. Henry Sutpen’s moral
destruction, for example, is accompanied by his prioritizing
personal ambition over the collective good, something
Faulkner seems to suggest is present within the history of the
South itself. And yet Faulkner also suggests something else
within Absalom as he engages with both individuality and
collectivity: through the reading of many perspectives comes
a certain universal truth seen in all humankind. For example,
Faulkner himself explained this tension in Absalom, claiming
that “no one individual can look at truth” (qtd. in Jabbur
12). He further explained that “[i]t was, as you say, thirteen
ways of looking at a blackbird.” But the truth comes out, that
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when the reader has read all these thirteen ways of looking
at a blackbird, the reader has his own fourteenth image of
that blackbird, which I would like to think is the truth” (qtd.
in Jabbur 13). This is also consistent with Kant’s notion
that, while humans contain all the same cognitive abilities,
when they exercise imagination and reason and come to use
their “supersensible” faculty to arouse moral judgment, their
sublime experience allows them to comprehend a universal
rule common to all humanity. Furthermore, this universal is
a “function of subjectivity,” thus making the “harmonious
interplay” between individual freedom and communal
agreement a necessary requirement for moral reasoning and,
ultimately, the creation of meaning within life (Jabbur 12).
In essence, one must experience the sublime to achieve a
balance between these two contending forces, within both
their understanding of artistic creations (in the novel’s
case, narratives) and within their capacity to make moral
determinations.
Indeed, this notion of the universal, sublime
experience can help explain Sutpen’s moral destruction. For
example, Faulkner describes the conditions surrounding
Sutpen’s youth, saying that “where he lived the land
belonged to anybody and everybody,” implying that before
Sutpen’s transformation into an immoral, destructive
individual, he lived in a happier community that exercised
collective responsibility. However, all this changed when
his father forces the family to move: as they travel on a road
of “descent,” Faulkner writes about Sutpen’s uncertainty of
time and the passing of seasons: “whether they overtook and
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passed in slow succession the seasons as they descended
or whether it was the descent itself that did it and they not
progressing parallel in time but descending perpendicularly
through temperature and climate” (182). By highlighting the
notion of timelessness and repeating the word “descent,”
Faulkner emphasizes the point at which Sutpen begins
his moral destruction. Hence, whereas Sutpen’s youthful
state where land belonged to “anybody and everybody”
within a collective realm expresses the sublime condition
of universal morality, his family’s “descent” after their
relocation helps to illustrate the point at which Sutpen
begins his individualization and descends into the state of
immorality. His destructive prioritization of the individual
over the collective is clearly evident later in the novel,
as Sutpen arrives home after the Civil War and refuses to
express emotional support for his family, thus sacrificing his
daughter’s and other children’s needs in order to serve his
own selfish interests. Interestingly enough, while Faulkner
answered questions at a meeting of the English Club at the
University of Virginia in 1957, he described the character of
Sutpen: “He said, I’m going to be the one that lives in the big
house, I’m going to establish a dynasty, I don’t care how, and
he violated all the rules or decency and honor and pity and
compassion, and the fates took revenge on him” (qtd. in Karl
549). In other words, Faulkner points out the consequences
of Sutpen’s selfish individualism and disregard for the
collective good of his immediate family and the surrounding
community of Jefferson. In essence, Faulkner foregrounds
Sutpen’s immorality in order to emphasize the tension
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between individual interests and collective responsibility
when it comes to human moral capacity.
While the priority of individual interest over
collective good dooms both Sutpen and his family, this
thematic trend allows the story to serve as an example
of the South, thus elevating the novel through a sense of
sublime, universal applicability. As Frederick Karl explains,
Sutpen’s character seemed to be the product of Faulkner’s
own attempt at healing his personal problems of the past,
thus serving as an aesthetically sublime experience that
allowed Faulkner to exercise both reason and imagination
to form his own personal truth and meaning that might be
shared with readers. Yet more importantly, Karl points out
that “Faulkner is exalting pride and yet demonstrating how
destructive it can be; and he is revealing how that aspect of
the South—and, by implication, the country—is destructive”
(549). In other words, the beneficial but destructive nature
of individual pride must be carefully balanced with a sense
of collective responsibility, an equilibrium that Faulkner
suggests that the South failed to achieve. Furthermore,
by illustrating that Sutpen’s selfish individualism is a
destructive force, Faulkner is also revealing how the selfish
nature of the South led to self-destruction instead of a
greater, common good. In fact, Jabbur explains that the
people of Yoknapatawpha “ostracize Sutpen in part because
his difference from the community reminds them, ironically,
of themselves” (12). Just as the destruction of Sutpen is the
result of his disregard for the community around him, so is
the destruction of the South a result of its violation of the
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larger morality of the “human family.” By illustrating this
moral tension and some of the destructive consequences, the
novel itself achieves the sublime: it becomes a “fourteenth
image,” a new “supersensible” faculty that unites both
individual and collective interests in its universal, moral
applicability.
In addition to his use of Sutpen to showcase
the tension between individual interest and collective
responsibility, Faulkner employs the characters of Quentin
and Shreve to explore the sublime experience and the
possibility of a universal morality. To begin with, according
to Jabbur, Faulkner’s decision to exercise authority over
the text by withholding facts (a notable characteristic in
most of his work) teases the reader and deprives him or
her from learning about the issues of race that lie central to
the novel. However, by withholding information, Faulkner
also encourages his readers to achieve their own sublime
experience as they exercise their “supersensible” faculties
and discover a “fourteenth image” of truth. In this regard,
it is Shreve who ultimately achieves a sense of the sublime
while Quentin fails. Throughout the last third of the novel,
Shreve seems to exercise that same harmony between
imagination and reason, particularly as he ultimately
exercises the “supersensible” faculty to make a moral
judgment concerning the issue of race. As Jabbur points
out, however, it is Quentin who silences Shreve just as he is
about to tackle the topic of miscegenation. “Wait, I tell you!”
cries Quentin, suggesting that he “would rather not discuss
the issue that lies at the moral center of the Civil War,” and
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is instead stuck within his own self-experience of history
and unable to think deeply about the collective faults of the
South (Faulkner 222; Jabbur 25). Nevertheless, at the end
of the last chapter, Shreve expresses his moral judgment by
theorizing about the Jim Bonds who will one day come to
spread throughout the world; Quentin, however, expresses
his unwillingness to hear what Shreve has to say. Instead of
acquiescing to Quentin’s request, Shreve responds, “Then
I’ll tell you” (qtd. In Jabbur 27). While Shreve reaches a
sense of moral judgment, imagining the future and climbing
outside his own individual self to enter the collective realm,
Quentin is stuck in the past.
Quentin’s inability to reach sublimity is further
reflected in his repetition of certain familiar stories, while
Rosa, on the other hand, reaches the sublime through her
ability to finally show compassion. While Quentin has
already heard the story of Sutpen many times, as well as
even encountered Henry Sutpen himself, he still feels the
need to relate the story to Shreve. His excessive narrative
repetition of the past reflects Freudian theory: what led
Freud to the notion of the thanatos instinct was “the curious
tendency he noted on the part of those suffering from severe
trauma to relive the traumatic moment and to do so in
various forms: in analysis, in dreams, in unconscious habits”
(Hutcheon 269). Freud observed that “traumatized patients
exhibited a ‘compulsion to repeat’ that had a drive-like
quality about it, giving the appearance of some ‘daemonic’
force at work” (qtd. in Hutcheon 269-70). This idea makes
sense considering that Quentin later resorts to suicide.
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Yet what Freud’s notion reveals is that Quentin considers
the Sutpen story and his experience seeing Henry to be a
traumatic part of his own essential self. Thus, compelled to
narrate and analyze the story of Sutpen over and over again,
he is so wrapped up in his own internal psyche that he is
unable to make any moral judgments that model a sense of
the collective, universal truth resonating in Kant’s notion
of the sublime. Contrary to Quentin, however, Rosa, while
compulsively trapped within her almost uncontrollable
rage and her hate for the Sutpen family, ultimately reaches
a sense of meaning and sublimity when she returns to the
home with an ambulance, intent on saving the dying Henry.
This even resonates within Mr. Compson’s letter, where he
imagines that she is finally able to realize that the “objects
of the outrage and of the commiseration also are no longer
ghosts but are actual people to be actual recipients of the
hatred and the pity” (Faulkner 302). Rosa is able to imagine
real humans where “ghosts” used to be, thus leading her to
have compassion, something that Faulkner believed was
one of the core attributes of humanity. However, Quentin
seems to remain within a world bordering between past and
present, light and dark, and, ultimately, his own ability to
find meaning through the sublime. As Jabbur explains,
“[w]hat Faulkner’s narrative presents is, indeed, the sublime:
or, more correctly, a medium for experiencing our own
sublimity even as Faulkner’s might-have-beens fail to
experience theirs” (18). As many of the characters fail to
reconcile “personal will and public responsibility” through
sublimity and moral judgment, or conceiving of what
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“might-have-been,” (just as Shreve conceives of the future
and Rosa possibly ignites her “supersensible” faculty to
imagine humans instead of ghosts), Faulkner creates art that
encourages readers to transcend their own individual selves
and consider the collective good.
Although Quentin’s traumatic repetition of the
central narrative indicates his inability to achieve the
sublime, the novel reveals a few instances where Shreve and
even Quentin achieve an almost sublime, collective morality
through their shared aesthetic experience of storytelling.
As they narrate the story in their cold, Harvard dormitory,
there are times when both characters seem to unify into one,
whether it is finishing one another’s sentences or actually
becoming indistinguishable from the text itself; moreover,
Shreve especially seems to lose sight of his own individual
ambitions, becoming so caught up in his curiosity about
the story. As touched on previously, Sutpen’s childhood,
where the land belonged to “anybody and everybody,” was
characterized by a similar sense of collective morality, a kind
of sublime state of equality and oneness between humans
and the natural world. The interactions between Quentin and
Shreve mirror this sense of oneness.
However, despite the fact that the act of storytelling
offers temporary escape from the confines of the individual
self, Faulkner makes it quite clear that Quentin ultimately
fails to achieve a sense of the sublime. As Shreve offers
evidence of sublimity through his moral judgments of the
South and his imaginative prediction of the future, Quentin
struggles to transcend his internal psyche:

53

Quentin did not answer, staring at the window; then
he could not tell if it was the actual window or the
window’s pale rectangle upon his eyelids, though
after a moment it began to emerge. It began to take
shape in its same curious, light, gravity-defying
attitude—the once-folded sheet out of the wisteria
Mississippi summer, the cigar smell, the random
blowing of the fireflies. . .It was becoming quite
distinct; he would be able to decipher the words
soon, in a moment; even almost now, now, now.
(Faulkner 301)

While it first offers a glimpse of hope, suggesting that
Quentin enters a collective “oneness” with the world around
him (through the window), seeing the world in a new light,
the passage quickly illustrates his failure to transcend his
individuality. As Quentin recognizes the familiar image of
the window, he once again falls back into his internal world
and becomes doomed to relive the traumatic past. Finally,
after Shreve comments on how Southerners “outlive”
themselves, Quentin tries hard to decipher the “words,”
suggesting his attempt to achieve a harmony between reason
and imagination. His repetition of the word “now” illustrates
his attempt to bring meaning from the past into the present;
and yet, as the novel’s ending reveals, he internalizes his
thoughts once again by repeating that he doesn’t hate the
South, further emphasizing his inner conflict between the
individual and the collective, between the past and the
present. Quentin is hopelessly trapped within his internal
world, unable to let go of his past and imagine a “fourteenth
image” of universal truth. Like Sutpen, he fails to achieve
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the sublime. However, Quentin is far from the obsessively
selfish, individuated Sutpen: Quentin at least tries, almost
desperately, to experience the sublime, lingering between
the two worlds within the twilight. More importantly, his
struggle in Absalom, Absalom! reveals more heartbreaking
insight into another one of Faulkner’s beloved novels:
Quentin’s same failure to reconcile the individual and the
collective, the past and the future becomes the motivational
force behind his tragic suicide in The Sound and the Fury.
In his Nobel Speech, Faulkner ascribes sublimity
to the work of the poet: “He must teach himself that the
basest of all things is to be afraid; and, teaching himself
that, forget it forever, leaving no room in his workshop for
anything but the old verities and truths of the heart, the old
universal truths lacking which any story is ephemeral and
doomed—love and honor and pity and pride and compassion
and sacrifice” (nobelprize.org). Just as individuals first
confront the sublime with feelings of tremendous fear and
inadequacy, they eventually move beyond that condition
as they exercise the harmonious interplay of reason and
imagination, laboring in their “workshop” to create the
unimaginable through a heightened sense of human morality.
As Faulkner himself seemed to point out, these “verities
and truths of the heart” are what bring humans together in
a universal, moral framework of both individual freedom
and collective responsibility—the essence of the sublime
experience. Similarly, through the aesthetic experience of
literature, Faulkner encourages the reader to use both reason
and imagination to achieve a “supersensible” faculty of
universal, human truth.
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Understanding Death in Brown and Poe:
Backgrounds and Continuities
			
Anthony Cunder
Seton Hall University
South Orange, New Jersey

“Thus early had that one guest—the only guest
who is certain, at one time or another, to find his
way into every human dwelling—thus early had
Death stepped across the threshold of the House
of the Seven Gables!” (Hawthorne 8)

I

n Chris Wedge’s animated film, Epic, death is a villainous
figure, personified in the form of Mandrake, the King
of Rot. This contemporary interpretation asserts that death
is a force that must be overcome by the life of the forest,
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embodied by Queen Tara and her army of green Leafmen.
Death is not welcome in the forest; it seeks only to destroy
life. Mandrake speaks in the film of the “borders” erected
around his island of Rot by the Leafmen, all “in the name
of balance.” “Well, I’m sick of balance,” he says (Wedge).
The solution Epic offers to the problem of death is to fight it.
When death rebels against the boundaries set by life, it must
be eradicated.
While this response at first appears heroic, it
presents a number of difficulties and complications regarding
the presumed “defeat” of Death that are never resolved. For
example, at the end of the film, the viewer never learns what
happens to Mandrake’s island of Rot after he is absorbed into
a tree. Is death truly eradicated? If so, will the denizens of
the forest live forever? Will they retain their youth?
Though the film does not address these concerns,
Epic engages with an essentially timeless problem that is
treated in such early texts as Chaucer’s “Pardoner’s Tale”
and emerges again in American gothic texts, such as Charles
Brockden Brown’s Wieland and Edgar Allan Poe’s “The
Black Cat.” All three offer a similar, alternative answer to
Chris Wedge’s villainous characterization of death. Their
answers acknowledge death as undesirable but also concede
that it is a necessary function in the mechanics of the world.
In Chaucer’s tale, for example, three rambunctious young
men go out to seek Death in the hopes of killing him—“we
wol sleen this false traitour Deeth” (PTl. 699)—but cannot
avoid his grasp. Similarly, Brown and Poe reach back
into the treasure trove of folklore and medieval narrative
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to comment on the nature of a reality that is impossible to
escape.
S.G.F. Brandon, in “The Personification of
Death in Some Ancient Religions,” points to Paleolithic
understandings of death, particularly in the burial rituals
known to be a part of early cultures. Such “mortuary
practice,” he suggests, “whatever its origin may be thought
to have been…must presuppose some reflection about death,
which would surely in turn have involved some speculation
about the cause of death” (317). Even from such early
stages of human history, death played a significant role in
society and in cultivating attitudes toward life and the future
in general. Brandon goes on to conclude that “Paleolithic
peoples were likely to have inferred that death by disease
must be due to the attack of some agent whom they could not
see, but of whose activity they had such doleful proof” (318).
It is important to consider how attitudes and perspectives
towards death have evolved over the ages and to examine
the warnings implicit in texts such as Chaucer’s, Brown’s,
and Poe’s in relation to the view of death as a sentient being,
orchestrating and planning the end of life as Mandrake does.
In Chaucer’s tale, Death holds power over the
rioters, despite their arrogant declaration that they will
find and destroy it. This power is revealed especially in
the youngest of the three. After the rioters embark on their
quest to seek Death, they are informed by an Old Man they
encounter upon the road that Death awaits them under a
nearby tree. The Old Man himself seeks Death, although
he cannot find it, claiming that “deeth, allas, ne wol not han
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[his] lif” (PT l. 727); that he must walk “lik a restelees caitif
[as longe time as it is Goddes wille]” (PT ll. 726-28). Here,
Death is something desired, a conclusion for which the Old
Man longs but which he cannot find. While a contemporary
film such as Epic would celebrate the Old Man’s immunity
from Death, “The Pardoner’s Tale” uses it to highlight the
difficulties of immortality without eternal youth, showing the
consequences of endless life that necessarily brings with it
the unavoidable and debilitating complications of old age.
Yet, while the Old Man cannot find Death, Chaucer’s
three rioters have no such trouble. Upon reaching the grove,
they discover baskets of gold, Death embodied within the
guise of greed. The youngest of the three is tasked with
returning to town for food and drink while the other two
remain with the gold until nightfall. Once the youngest
leaves, the others plan to kill him when he returns so that the
treasure might be divided among two rather than three (PT ll.
760-836). The youngest, enthralled by a similar selfish desire
for the gold, says,
O Lord…if so were that I mighte
Have al this tresor to myself allone,
Ther is no man that liveth under the trone
Of God that shoulde live so mirye as I!
(PT ll. 840-4)

The subsequent three lines are particularly significant.
Chaucer writes, “And atte laste the feend, oure enemy, /
Putte in his thoght that he shoulde poison beye, / With which
he mighte sleen his felawes tweye” (PT ll. 844-6). Notably,
it is Death—“the fiend, our enemy”—that gives this rioter
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the idea to buy poison and kill his companions. However, it
is not an idea that materializes spontaneously. Instead, Death
is able to manipulate the man’s already murderous thoughts,
cultivating the seed planted there. The young rioter becomes
Death’s agent, chosen not randomly or arbitrarily but rather
because of his predisposition toward killing.
Another aspect of Chaucer’s commentary on death is
its reality in the lives of mankind and a warning against any
attempt to destroy Death as the rioters seek to do. Elizabeth
Hatcher writes of Chaucer’s young men as follows:
idealistic simpletons, they intend to create a utopia
of life without death in one ironically death-dealing
stroke. When they have slain Death, no one will
ever die again—and the world will therefore be
perfect….[T]his plan parodies Christ’s redemptive
act:…his [death] overcame the death of the soul
whereas theirs aims to overcome the death of the
body; his preserved but transcended the natural
mortality of the individual whereas theirs aims to
subvert the state of nature. (247 emphasis added)

In attempting to create a perfect world in which no one dies,
the rioters ignore the consequences that such an attempt will
bring, creating a world in which people live endlessly—and
at the same time, suffer forever the pains of old age.
Authors in the American gothic tradition also
attempt to understand how death may be a necessary part of
life, counteracting the prevailing sentiments of optimism,
progress, clarity and order typical of the Age of Reason.
They rekindle the emotions connected with death, and in
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doing so, they attempt to discredit imprudent efforts to
evade the Reaper’s call. This sentiment finds expression in
the depiction of death, since it can strike anywhere at any
time, often without cause or explanation. In the gothic tale,
death acquires its own countenance, its own voice, and its
own character that gives it a personality, a substance, and
an agency. However, it is not an agency without purpose, as
Gary Farnell, in “Gothic’s Death Drive,” reveals. Quoting
Pope Pius VI, Farnell writes, “In all living beings the
principle of life is no other than that of death: at the same
time we receive the one we receive the other, we nourish
both within us, side by side” (592). This juxtaposition of life
and death offers a way of viewing death as essential to life, a
concept manipulated and embraced by gothic writers.
In Wieland, death has a voice that ultimately
convinces Theodore Wieland to become its agent. Chapter
Nineteen begins with Wieland producing his defense against
the charge of murdering his wife and children. He does
not deny the act. In fact, he says, “You know that they are
dead, and that they were killed by me. What more would
you have?” It is as if his will is somehow being subverted
or manipulated by an external force. In fact, while she is
being attacked by Wieland, Catharine refers to his having
been possessed by “a fury resistless and horrible” (ch.
19), suggesting that Wieland is, in fact, controlled by
some other being. Wieland himself also indicates a lack of
agency, claiming that “to rebel against [his] mandate was
impossible” (ch. 19). Some power overcomes his free will,
issuing a mandate that consumes him. That power is death
itself.
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Quoting a text from the Greco-Roman period,
Brandon expands upon the notion of death’s calling:
“Everyone to whom [Death] calleth comes to him
straightaway, their hearts being affrighted through fear of
him…Yet he turns not his face towards [those who petition
him], he comes not to him who implores him, he hearkens
not when he is worshipped; he shows himself not, even
though any manner of bribe be given him” (321). This
echoes the plight of Chaucer’s Old Man and also provides a
context in which to examine Brown’s text. In Wieland, Clara,
the text’s narrator and Wieland’s sister, also at times seems
to be calling for death, but it is a plea fueled by motives
different from the Old Man’s. Through much of the story,
Clara Wieland expresses a concern about her impending
doom, especially a preoccupation about the uncertain time
and nature by which it might take place. Clara proclaims,
“Death must happen to all. Whether our felicity was to be
subverted by it tomorrow, or whether it was ordained that we
should lay down our heads full of years and of honor, was
a question that no human being could solve” (ch. 6). Her
concern appears to be centered on the seemingly arbitrary
and capricious nature of death rather than the ailments and
pains of the Old Man who desires Death as a release from
the infirmities of advanced age. Clara provides an answer
to the Old Man’s dilemma: “Men can deliberately untie the
thread of life” (ch. 25), even admitting that she had “deemed
herself capable [of it] (ch. 25). Suicide, then, appears as a
solution to the uncertainty of when death will strike and
a means by which one can find release. It responds to
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the arbitrariness of a sentient Death who seems to assert
complete control over the lives of men, deciding when and
where they will pass from this life into the next.
But it is a problematic answer, a fallacy of selfempowerment that does not free one from the power of
death. Clara, at one point, views her penknife as a method
by which she can “baffle [her] assailant, and prevent the
crime by destroying [herself]” (ch. 10). Clara’s fear of the
unknown—of what Carwin might do to her—compels her
to seek refuge in an equally uncertain course of action.
The path that lies beyond death’s gate is as inscrutable as
what might lie in wait behind Clara’s closet door. Yet, in
contemplating suicide, Clara attempts to assert her own
autonomy, leaving the choice of life and death not in her
assailant’s hands (or death’s) but her own. Her self-agency
is valued more than her life. But Clara’s desire for death
is problematized further when one recognizes her age and
condition. While the Old Man in the “Pardoner’s Tale”
may have a valid reason for seeking Death, Clara is still
in her prime, with the potential for a full life ahead of her.
Though both Clara and the Old Man seek death, the latter
demonstrates the folly of seeking physical immortality while
the former highlights the folly of an undue fear of death—in
fearing the power and inscrutability of death, Clara nearly
submits to it, sooner than would have been, by nature,
required of her.
To further press this fear of an arbitrary and
capricious death, Brown writes that, when Theodore Wieland
goes to his sister’s house to discover if any
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ill-thing has happened to her, he [Wieland] encounters
a vision, “luminous and glowing. It was the element of
heaven that flowed around,” Wieland claims. “Nothing but
a fiery stream was at first visible; but, anon, a shrill voice
from behind called upon me to attend” (ch. 19). This voice
subsequently convinces Wieland to kill his wife, coaxing
him into murder just as Death encouraged Chaucer’s young
rioter to do the same. However, in Wieland, death is not
an image of darkness. It is not a “fiend, our enemy,” a
Reaper shrouded and cloaked, as Chaucer presents it in the
“Pardoner’s Tale,” or a heap of gold that embodies death
in the sins of greed and gluttony. Instead, it is a depicted
as light and is strangely reminiscent of God. Described by
Wieland as “the element of heaven,” a “fiery stream” that
engulfs him yet does not burn him as it did his father (ch.
19), this conflation of death and heaven may suggest that
the two are interchangeable. Wieland tells Clara that “if a
devil has deceived [him], he came in the habit of an angel”
(ch. 25). But how can an angel demand death, unless it is
the Angel of Death? Clara questions the events surrounding
her father’s mysterious demise, wondering if it is “fresh
proof that the Divine Ruler interferes in human affairs,
meditates an end, selects, and commissions his agents, and
enforces, by unequivocal sanctions, submission to his will”
(ch. 2). Brown explores the source of death by questioning
its character and suggests, through Clara, that perhaps the
source of life is also the source of death, building upon
Chaucer’s depiction while at the same time establishing a
fresh perspective.
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In traditional Hebrew philosophy regarding
mortality, “God is regarded as ultimately responsible for [an]
individual’s death…Consequently…the dominant view is
that death is due to the action of God. However, the tendency
to separate Yahweh from direct contact with human affairs
seems to have produced the idea of ‘the angel of Yahweh’ as
the agent of death” (Brandon 325). This correlation between
death and the divine as apparent coadjutors hearkens back
to the exclamation of Chaucer’s Old Man, “God yow se”
(PT l. 715): “may God protect you,” even as he sends the
rioters to their deaths. Thus Death does its work, perhaps
under the mantle of God himself, with the giver of life and
the taker of it operating in tandem. In Chapter Nineteen of
Wieland, Wieland tells Catharine, “I was commissioned to
kill thee, but not to torment thee with the foresight of thy
death; not to multiply thy fears, and prolong thy agonies.”
Death as a servant of heaven does not intend to “torment,
multiply fears, or prolong agonies”; however, these aspects
of death are often inescapable and may lead to the barriers
that arise between contemplations of the horrors of death and
meditations on the paradise of heaven.
This distinction, nevertheless, ignores the fact that
in order to reach heaven one must first pass through death’s
gate. Gary Farnell pushes the argument further, asserting that
aspects of Freud’s own theory of the human “death drive”
allude to “the interlinking of destruction and creation in an
apparent drive within Nature towards death itself” (596).
In Theodore Wieland’s case, it is true that he has brutally
murdered his wife; but at the same time, he has, presumably,
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pushed her through death’s door into the heavenly paradise,
attainable only through the reality of human destruction. A
world of physical immortality as sought after by Chaucer’s
three rioters “would have no heavenly afterlife to inspire its
inhabitants to charity,” as Elizabeth Hatcher explains (248).
This paradox of death as the necessary precipitate for entry
into paradise is embodied in the gothic, a genre that subverts
the notion that, despite the sacrifices required for progress,
a reasonable balance between happiness and sadness might
be found, rejecting Enlightenment ideals that privilege
happiness in this life and discount the necessity of death and
its function in bringing one truly to eternal peace.
Thus, Theodore Wieland becomes a model for this
system, killing not only his wife and children but also his
emotions as a husband and father, suppressing the “raptures
known only to the man whose parental and conjugal love
is without limits” (ch. 19), reinterpreting the traditional
happiness found in marriage and parenthood in order to
achieve a higher form of happiness. Brown also replaces
the customary darkness of morbidity with an environment
“luminous and glowing” (ch. 19), vaulting death into a
position of dominance and superiority while emphasizing
a death that, although powerful and necessary, is also, at
times, arbitrary. Wieland’s final role as death’s agent, then,
is to take his own life (ch. 26), using the knife that Clara
considered for her own destruction. Wieland reaffirms
Clara’s earlier sentiments that death indeed has a “hand
invisible and of preternatural strength” and that “all places
were alike accessible to this foe” (ch. 9), even the hearts and
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minds of his agents and victims.
In “Literature and the Impossibility of Death: Poe’s
‘Berenice,’” Arthur Brown draws from Poe’s perceptions of
death to argue that, in dying, humans “leave behind not only
the world but also death…ceasing to be man…ceasing to
be mortal” (449), as if mankind’s inherent aversion toward
death comes not from what it may bring or the unknown
that may lie in wait behind death’s door but simply from the
fact that once that door is passed through and the threshold
is crossed, it can never be crossed again. The end of life
marks the beginning of “undying death,” which is “real in
its incarnation as writing” (Brown 449). Undying death is
more than spiritual or physical immortality: it is the pain and
torment of the Old Man, wasting away, lamenting, “Lo, how
I vanisshe, flessh and blood and skin” (PT l. 733), his sorrow
preserved eternally in Chaucer’s language.
“Death is a mystery which fascinates and repels…
It is sublime because it remains a terrifying mystery, not
simply unknowable but linked with human desires that we
wish to keep unknown,” writes David Morris (309). This
paradox exists in Clara, in her fluctuating attraction to death
and repulsion by it. She argues that “[t]he will is the tool of
the understanding, which must fashion its conclusions on the
notices of the sense” (ch. 4). If death remains a mystery, then
a misunderstanding of it can lead to a corruption of the will,
the greatest and most powerful means by which death can
terrorize humanity. Death, as an unseen presence, is difficult
to understand via the senses. The effects are discernible,
but their cause—particularly until the advent of modern
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science—remains inscrutable, as Theodore Wieland often
asserts. Hence, a faulty understanding becomes the medium
by which Wieland loses his agency and becomes death’s
agent. The predominant fear in the text, and the point that
the story seems to make, revolves around the arbitrariness
of death and the lack of control available to humanity
when faced with its call. This does not suggest that death is
inherently evil. On the contrary, a misunderstanding of death
seems to be the greater evil, and one by which Wieland’s will
is corrupted.
In Edgar Allan Poe’s “The Black Cat,” death does
not appear as a heavenly light but rather in the guise of the
narrator’s first cat, appropriately named Pluto after the Greek
god of the underworld. Of all the other pets supposedly
loved by the narrator, this cat is the only one whose name is
provided: “Pluto—this was the cat’s name” (79). To explore
the ways in which the story attempts to reveal underlying
truths about death through the figure of Pluto, it is important
to examine several elements of the tale: Pluto’s death and
apparent reincarnation in the appearance of the second cat;
the narrator’s attitude toward Pluto and his successor; the
event that leads to the murder of the narrator’s wife; and,
finally, the circumstances surrounding the narrator’s capture
and implied demise via the gallows.
When the narrator describes his desire to kill Pluto,
despite his former love for the feline, he says:
And then came, as if to my final and irrevocable
overthrow, the spirit of PERVERSENESS. Of this
spirit, philosophy takes no account…Who has not,
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a hundred times, found himself committing a vile
or a silly action, for no other reason than because
he knows he should not? Have we not a perpetual
inclination…to violate that which is Law, merely
because we understand it to be such? This spirit of
perverseness, I say, came to my final overthrow. It
was this unfathomable longing of the soul to vex
itself—to offer violence to its own nature—to do
wrong for wrong’s sake only—that urged me to
continue and finally to consummate the injury I had
inflicted upon the unoffending brute. One morning,
in cool blood, I slipped a noose about its neck and
hung it to the limb of a tree. (80)

The first element of this passage that deserves attention is
the narrator’s proclaimed “spirit of perverseness.” According
to the Oxford English Dictionary, one who is perverse can
be described as “going or disposed to go against what is
reasonable, logical, expected, or required; contrary, fickle,
irrational.” The word is derived from the Latin perversus,
meaning “turned the wrong way, awry, unnatural, abnormal,
wrong-headed, misguided, perverted.” If the narrator wants
to kill Pluto—embodying an underlying desire to kill
death—can the narrator’s actions and desires be defined as
“perverse”? Is killing death illogical?
Indeed it is, since it contradicts the very nature of
what death is. As the ruler of the dead, death itself cannot
be killed, or else it must necessarily submit to its own rule,
contradicting the essence of sovereignty. This paradox leads
to the second element of the passage: the notion that the
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narrator represents a desire to violate some “law” merely
because it is such. The law of nature requires all living
beings to submit, at one time or another, to the power of
death. Any attempt to evade such power indefinitely is
contrary to natural law—it is perverse.
And yet, Pluto—death—avoids the narrator
prior to the atrocious act. Pluto “fled in extreme terror at
[the narrator’s] approach” (80), an act which ultimately
leads, according to the narrator, to the advent of the spirit
of perverseness. Could the avoidance of death be what
truly irritated the narrator? Knowing that death lurked
behind closed doors, yet refused to reveal itself plainly?
The narrator claims that a third element to this spirit of
perverseness is the “longing of the soul to vex itself—to offer
violence to its own nature” (80). If the violence the narrator
will soon perpetrate is truly against his own soul—his own
nature—then death must be a part of that nature. Pluto’s
avoidance perturbs the narrator since it is a part of himself
that flees at his approach. In Greek mythology, Pluto is
not simply the god of the underworld but also “a god of the
earth’s fertility” (Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia). This,
at first, seems to be a contradiction. However, the processes
of nature may provide an explanation. The world often
requires death to invigorate new life: animals must die to
feed carnivores; vegetation must die to feed herbivores; the
cycle of life requires death to play a part, and any attempt
to destroy or kill death must necessarily be an attempt to
kill life as well. Joseph J. Moldenhauer describes Poe’s
own cosmology as one “in which Beauty, Goodness, and
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Truth are a Unity—with Death” (qtd. in Thompson 297).
The application is relevant here, where “The Black Cat”
links death with goodness; the narrator both loves and hates
Pluto, and thus both loves and hates death. In truth, Pluto is
something of a neutral character, acted upon by the narrator
yet never displaying any overt aggression or evil of his own.
This portrayal of death, as does Wieland’s, suggests that
death is not inherently evil, but nor is it inherently good.
It is simply a fact of life, an inevitable reality that remains
hidden, unseen, oftentimes ignored, and almost universally
avoided.
Thus, the reality of death is never truly unveiled
until one’s time has come, perhaps not even then, as “there
is none can see him, either of gods or men” (Brandon 321).
The narrator is granted this special privilege of seeing
death, though he scorns it. Pluto’s successor follows the
narrator “with a pertinacity which it would be difficult to
make the reader comprehend” (Poe 83). Yet, rather than
accept the affections of the cat, the narrator “avoid[s] the
creature” and “[flees] silently from its odious presence, as
from the breath of a pestilence” (Poe 82). The narrator sees
the cat/death as a dreadful creature, despite its intrinsic
necessity. After he kills Pluto—a futile attempt to kill death
itself—he soon understands that death has returned to
haunt him. The unnamed new cat sports a white mark on its
chest, a mark that “by slow degrees…assumed a rigorous
distinctness of outline. It was now the representation of an
object…, the image of a hideous—of a ghastly thing—of the
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GALLOWS!—oh, mournful and terrible engine of Horror
and of Crime—of Agony and of Death!” (Poe 83).
This nightmare of death surrounds the narrator,
overwhelms him, and ultimately seduces him into becoming
death’s agent because he cannot bring himself to accept
death as a necessary condition of life. He attempts, as he did
before, to kill the cat and rid himself of death, to evade it
despite the fact that it is most certainly part of him, as it is
part of everyone. He says, “Evil thoughts became my sole
intimates” (Poe 83), and, “uplifting an axe…I aimed a blow
at the animal which…would have proved instantly fatal had
it descended as I wished” (84). Yet, it does not, and, enraged
by his wife’s interference, the narrator “withdrew [his] arm
from her grasp and buried the axe in her brain” (84). He is
goaded not only by his wife’s interference but also by death’s
provocation in the form of the gallows-branded cat, “which
had been the cause of so much wretchedness” (85). Murder,
therefore, becomes an “aesthetic act, for it is One with
the design of the Universe as Poe describes it in Eureka”
(Thompson 297). The narrator is absorbed by an obsession
with death, one that is not entirely in conflict with the design
of the universe, since all must die. However, the narrator’s
aesthetic inclinations go awry when he perversely directs his
death drive towards death itself.
Continuing in his rage, he experiences a fervent
urge to kill his cat, “but it appeared that the crafty animal
had been alarmed at the violence of [his] previous anger,
and forbore to present itself in [his] present mood” (85). The
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narrator fails to learn from his previous mistake, a hubristic
one in which he attempts to place himself equal to God in
having the ability to kill death. He laments that a cat could
cause “for [him]—for [him] a man, fashioned in the image
of the High God—so much of insufferable woe!” (83). But
it is not for man to destroy death, since this is reserved only
to God. In St. Paul’s writings, Death—Thanatos—is “the
last enemy that will be destroyed,” being part of a “hierarchy
of demonic beings evidently hostile to God, that the
Messiah would ultimately subjugate” (Brandon 330-1). This
necessarily precludes any human being from killing death,
especially before the end-time, since this would assume a
level of power equal to that of the Messiah. The narrator, in
his hubris, attempts to assume this authority by killing Pluto,
thereby upsetting the balance of life and death in the world.
Death’s final appearance in the story—its ultimate
victory—comes when it secures the narrator’s discovery by
the police, calling attention to the wall in which death itself
is now entombed, with a “wailing shriek, half of horror and
half of triumph, such as might have arisen only out of hell,
conjointly from the throats of the damned in their agony and
of the demons that exult in the damnation” (Poe 86). The
mingling of diametrically opposed traits appears once more
with a final relish: the cat juxtaposes horror and triumph,
suffering and exultation. As G. R. Thompson argues,
“one cannot claim for the fascinated vision of death and
dissolution in Poe’s writings a totally ecstatic and beatific
vision. To claim such would be as serious a misreading of
Poe as that of those critics Moldenhauer wishes to correct”

75

(297). Though death at first seems neutral, even benign,
when threatened by the narrator with a perverse attempt at
destruction, it returns with a vengeance, punishing those who
seek to pervert the natural order and escape—or destroy—
death.
In Wieland and “The Black Cat,” death interacts
with the other characters, eliciting emotions, responses,
and even dialogue. The character of death in these two
texts offers new forms, new modes of viewing mortality,
building upon medieval representations that fashion death
as a fact of life. Though both of these gothic texts make this
concession, they also highlight certain elements of death that
generate concern and fear, namely its supposed arbitrariness
and the lack of human control when death calls its victims.
Despite new depictions of death as a luminous light or as
an affectionate black cat, its basic character remains much
the same, with slight modifications in each tale. In Wieland,
Brown questions the nature of death; Wieland “was much
conversant with the history of religious opinions, and
took pains to ascertain their validity…to settle the relation
between motives and actions, the criterion of merit, and
the kinds and properties of evidence” (Ch. 3). He sees the
“future, either as anterior, or subsequent to death, [as] a
scene that required some preparation and provision to be
made for it” and he had a “propensity to ruminate on these
truths” (Ch. 3). Wieland ponders the reality and nature of
death instead of enjoying life and living it to the fullest.
He does not espouse an outright desire to slay death as do
Chaucer’s medieval rioters or Poe’s narrator; however, his
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curiosity about and investigation into the nature of death
resemble the inquiry of the rioter who demanded of his
knave, “Go bet…and axe redily / What cors is this, that
passeth heer forby; / And looke that thow reporte his name
wel” (PT ll. 667-9). Wieland worries about life’s changeable
elements, resembling his father particularly in regard to his
sense that “the vicissitudes of human life were accustomed
to be viewed” (Ch. 3). Death, then, chooses as its victim one
who obsesses over the nature of life after death rather than
one who appreciates and relishes the life given him on earth.
“The Black Cat” highlights a similar injunction
against fighting the reality of death. The narrator chooses to
reject the natural order of the world—to “subvert the state of
nature”—and in doing so escalates his own encounter with
mortality. Had the narrator accepted Pluto/death in his life
without the perverseness that prompted him to murder, then
death would likely have coexisted with him for many more
peaceful years to come. However, because the narrator could
not accept death as a fact of life, the Reaper engages him
as his agent, subverting his will and destroying his agency.
The gothic genre suggests a subtle balance between life and
death, a balance that Epic loudly rejects, attributing heroism,
rather, to the one who destroys death. The gothic contends
that while death is a necessary reality of life, it should not
overwhelm or consume our lives. At the same time, it must
also be acknowledged and given its due credit, for those
who deny death also deny life, as those in Chaucer’s tale,
Theodore Wieland, and the narrator of “The Black Cat”
ultimately discover.
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